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Procedure to Secure Benefits Under the
Workmen's Compensation Act
JOHN GEISNESS*
This article is one of a series of two which will be published on
procedure under the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act.
The second article, to be written by Lowell P. Mickelwait, will deal
with the subject from the viewpoint of the employer.
The Workmen's Compensation Act establishes funds for the pay-
ment of benefits to workmen injured in certain industries, and to their
widows and children in the event of death. It also defines a procedure
for the assertion of the right to such benefits. Under that procedure,
the Department of Labor and Industries is vested with original juris-
diction over all claims. The courts are strictly limited to review of
questions already passed upon by the Department' unless the De-
partment is acting outside of the jurisdiction conferred upon it.2 The
legislature itself may not override the statutory procedure and ap-
propriate money from one of the funds to a workman.3
Original Application for Compensation
A. Limitations.
Proceedings to secure compensation are instituted by filing an appli-
cation with the Department of Labor and Industries. 4 The application
must be filed within one year "after the date upon which the injury
occurred or the rights of dependents or beneficiaries accrued."' The
Department provides a form of application and requires that such form
be used. However, an application to reopen a closed claim, under
a provision of the statute which we will mention later, evidently has
been allowed by the courts to operate as an original application, where
filed within the one-year period of limitation."
The one-year limitation has occasioned a few interesting problems.
Formerly, the statute required claims to be filed within one year after
"the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued". Applying that
language, the court held that where the injury did not immediately
manifest itself in any substantial disability, the application was timely
if filed within one year after the commencement of disability entitling
the workman to compensation. 7 And, again, an application was held
not to be barred by reason of the fact that there may have been some
compensable damage more than one year prior to the application,
where the claimant hoped on good medical authority for recovery, and
*Of the Seattle Bar.
'State ex rel. Winningham v. Olinger, 190 Wash. 697, 70 P. (2d) 317.
-Polson Logging Co. v. Kelly, 195 Wash. 167, 80 P. (2d) 412.
'State ex rel. Trenholm v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 547, 25 P. (2d) 569.
REM. REv. STAT. § 7686.
5Id.
'Matson v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 198 Wash. 507, 88 P. (2d) 825.
'Stolp v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 138 Wash. 685, 245 Pac. 20.
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filed his claim within a year after discovery of permanent disability.
At the next session of the legislature after the Stolp decision the pro-
vision in question was amended to its present form. This amendment
was held to require the filing of a claim within one year after the
accident, in view of the statutory definition of "injury" as a "sudden
and tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate
or prompt result, and occurring from without".8
Another decision affords some relief from stringencies suggested by
the one-year period of limitation. In Crabb v. Department of Labor
and Industries,9 a workman sustained an injury to an ankle and made
proper application for compensation, which was allowed. The claim
was soon closed and more than a year after the accident occurred,
"application was made to reopen the claim under a provision of the
statute hereinafter discussed, and it was alleged that the claimant's
neck had been injured in the accident which had been the subject
of the original application, but that no substantial disability had
resulted from the neck injury within the one-year period. The court
held that the original application was sufficient to require consideration
upon the merits of the application to reopen the claim.
If a workman dies as the result of accidental injury in the course
of his employment in extra-hazardous industry, or if he dies while
permanently and totally disabled as a result of such injury, his widow
is entitled to benefits. The claim of a widow is held to be an original
claim arising at the time of death, when the statute commences to
run.' 0 The fact that the husband's claim was barred by passage of
time prior to his death does not impair the widow's right under the
last-mentioned decision, although a right of action for damages for
wrongful death is, of course, so qualified."
There are some decisions relating to the Beels case which, at first
glance, are rather confusing. They are all cases in which the husband
made an application for compensation and secured some decision con-
cerning it prior to his death.' 2 For example, where a workman's
claim was closed by an order terminating compensation for temporary
total disability and fixing compensation for permanent partial disability,
and within one year of his death the widow filed an original claim
asserting that he died while totally disabled as a result of the injury
in question.'3 The rationale of those cases is that a widow's claim filed
within one year of her husband's death is never barred merely by
passage of time prior to the death, nor by any disposition of the hus-
band's claim during his lifetime, unless that disposition constitutes
an adverse adjudication of a fact essential to the claim of the widow.
Although closure of the husband's claim with an award for permanent
partial disability apparently might constitute such an adjudication, a
'Sandahl v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 170 Wash. 380, 16 P. (2d) 623.
9186 Wash. 505, 58 P. (2d) 1025, 105 A. L. R. 964.
'Beels v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 301, 34 P. (2d) 917.
"Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 181 Wash. 576, 44 P. (2d) 193.
" Wintermute v. Dept of Labor & Industries, 183 Wash. 169, 48 P. (2d)
627; McFarland v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P. (2d) 714;
Ek v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 91, 41 P. (2d) 1097.
"McFarland v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P. (2d) 714.
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closure of this character is deemed to be not inconsistent either with
the conclusion that the husband died as a result of the injury or while
permanently and totally disabled as a result thereof, the two circum-
stances under which the widow is entitled to compensation. 14 On the
other hand, it would appear that an adjudication that the husband
was not in the course of his employment at the time of the injury
in question would be necessarily inconsistent with any claim on behalf
of the widow, and it would constitute a bar, if allowed to become
final, although made during the lifetime of the husband.
The original claim is acted upon ex parte by the Supervisor of In-
dustrial Insurance; no hearings are held unless proceedings for review
are instituted.
B. Effect of Change in Workman's Condition.
After final action has been taken upon a claim, the degree of dis-
ability suffered by the claimant may change. The statute makes specific
provision for such a contingency:1 5 "If aggravation, diminution or
termination of disability takes place or be discovered after the rate
of disability shall have been established or compensation terminated,"
the Director of Labor and Industries may, upon "the application of
the beneficiary, made within three years after the establishment or
termination of such compensation, or upon his own motion," readjust
or terminate compensation. An application by a beneficiary under
this provision is commonly an application to reopen a closed claim.
The three-year period of limitation runs from the final decision,
whether of Department or Court, establishing or terminating com-
pensation, so that if the claimant unsuccessfully appealed from the
original order of the Department terminating compensation, the three-
year period does not commence to run until entry of the adverse judg-
ment upon his appeal, and does not run from the date that com-
pensation payment did, in fact, stop. 6
Whether the three-year period of limitation applies to action taken
by the Director upon his own motion has been reserved for future
consideration."
The Act provides, 6 that where change in circumstances warrants
readjustment of compensation "like application shall be made there-
for" as for compensation in the first instance. Evidently giving the
statutory language quite a literal application, the Department pro-
vides and insists upon the use of a form of application for the reopening
of a closed claim which is very similar to the form provided for orig-
inal claims.
Review
A. Rehearing Within the Department.
The procedure for review of industrial insurance cases was radically
altered in 1927. Prior to that time decisions of the Department were
reviewed by direct appeal to the superior court. Now, a claimant must
first apply to the Director of Labor and Industries for a rehearing
'Id.
"REM. REV. STAT. § 7679 (h).
"Hunter v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 190 Wash. 380, 68 P. (2d) 224.
'Botica v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 184 Wash. 573, 52 P. (2d) 332.
1REVm. REV. STAT. § 7686 (e).
PROCEDURE TO SECURE BENEFITS
before a board, designated the Joint Board of the Department of
Labor and Industries."9 Such application must be made within sixty
days after the order, decision or award in question is communicated
to the 5laimant.20 Within thirty days of the decision of the Joint
Board upon such application, or within thirty days after the applica-
tion is deemed denied for non-action, as provided in the staute,21
appeal may be taken to the superior court and thence to the supreme
court as in other civil cases.
The Department of Labor and Industries has adopted simple rules
governing form and contents of applications for rehearing; but has not
yet strictly enforced- them. The supreme court -has held that the
application may be directed to the Department, and not to the Direc-
or, himself, as the statute literally requires, but that it must expressly
or impliedly request a rehearing. 22
The sixty-day period of limitation is ordinarily a strict limitation
upon the right of review,23 but it is qualified in at least two situations.
By statute, if, within that period, the Department orders "the submis-
sion of further evidence", or "the investigation of any further fact",
the time for appeal is extended until the applicant is advised in writing
of the Department's final order.24 This means that the time within
which applications for rehearing must be made does not, under such
circumstances, commence to run until notice of the final order..2 5 By
court decision, insanity of the applicant may extend the time, where
the circumstances are such as to invoke equitable considerations, al-
though the general statute pertaining to insanity and limitation of
actions2 - does not apply. -2 7
Upon rehearing, testimony is customarily taken before an examiner
employed by the Department. The statute provides that the rehear-
ings shall be de novo and summary, but also requires that witnesses
be sworn or that their testimony be taken by deposition as in cases
before the superior court. The extent to which the rules of evidence
are relaxed in proceedings before the Joint Board has not been defined
with any particularity. The court has held that a widow and a doctor
were properly permitted to testify as to statements made by the de-
cedent several days after the injury, describing the injury and the re-
action it caused.2 8 The court remarked that the statements "may not
have been admissible under the strict rules observed in court pro-
ceedings", but held them admissibl6 in view of the informality of pro-
ceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. If otherwise ad-
"1REM. REv. STAT. § 7697. State ex Tel. Winningham v. Olinger, 190 Wash.
697, 70 P. (2d) 317.
2The decisions concerning proof of such communication are a little
confusing. Cox v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash. 529, 32 P. (2d)
570; Farrow v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 453, 38 P. (2d) 240.
1'R Em. REV. STAT § 7697.
"Royse v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 193 Wash. 488, 76 P. (2d) 318.
"Boley v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash. 178, 31 P. (2d) 501;
Smith v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 101 Wash. Dec. 264.
21REm. REv. STAT. § 7679 (h).
"Taylor v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 175 Wash. 1, 26 P. (2d) 391.
-RMEm. REv. STAT. § 169.
"Ames v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 176 Wash. 509, 30 P. (2d) 239.
"McKinnie v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 245, 37 P. (2d) 218.
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missible, a widow's testimony concerning statements made by her
deceased husband is not barred by REMINGTON'S REVISED STATUTES,
§ 1211.29 Whether or not unsworn statements in the claim file, such
as medical reports, have evidentiary value is hereinafter discussed.
The statute30 requires that the application for rehearing set forth in
detail the grounds relied upon, include every issue to be considered
and set forth a detailed statement of facts. Nevertheless, an applica-
tion for rehearing will be deemed amended to conform to the proof.
3 1
It frequently happens that after application for rehearing is made,
the questions raised are by agreement submitted to a commission of
doctors for decision. Such agreements are called agreements for arbi-
tration, but the arbitration, such as it is, is purely voluntary at all
stages, and the commission decision is not binding upon the claimant,
notwithstanding language to the contrary in the agreement.32
B. Review by the Superior Court.
Appeal from the Joint Board decision is taken, by notice, to the
superior court of the county of the claimant's residence. No other
superior court has jurisdiction and the cause cannot be transferred
to another county for convenience of witnesses.13 No bond is required.
4
The Department files a certified copy of its record and delivers an-
other copy to counsel. This file was formerly full of irrelevant matter,
such as bills for medical expense, and general correspondence. A good
deal of effort and expense is now frequently saved by stipulations
eliminating at least a substantial part of the papers not material to
the review.
Upon appeal the case is at issue when the Department files its ap-
pearance, which it is required to do within twenty days. The record
may be filed at any time before the trial.
The testimony must be presented to court or jury in the same
manner as are depositions in other civil cases.
Until 1939, the Department of Labor and Industries was permit-
ted to introduced evidence in the superior court, whereas the claim-
ant was required to introduce all of his evidence before the Joint Board
of the Department and in court was limited to evidence rebutting that
adduced by the Department.3 5 Furthermore, the statute was construed
to permit a jury trial only in the discretion of the court, and the
jury's verdict was declared to be advisory only.36 These procedural
rules were changed by an Act of the 1939 Legislature37 which reads
as follows:
"In all appeals to the Superior Court from any order, de-
cision or award of the Joint Board of the Department of Labor
-'Devlin v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P. (2d) 952.
30REm. REV. STAT. § 7697.
"Brittain v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 499, 503, 35 P. (2d)
49; Cogdal v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 170 Wash. 639, 17 P. (2d) 55.
"-Smith v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 176 Wash. 569, 30 P. (2d) 656.
Tenneyson v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash. 616, 66 P. (2d) 314.
"'REM. REV. STAT. § 7697.
"See Murray v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 151 Wash. 95, 275 Pac. 66.
"Hodgen v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 541, 78 P. (2d) 949,
and cases following it.
"Ch. 184, § 1, p. 579, Laws 1939; REM. REV. STAT. Supp. § 7697-2.
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and Industries either party shall be entitled to a trial by
jury upon demand. The jury's verdict in every such appeal
shall have the same force and effect as in actions at law.
In any such appeal the trial shall be de novo and no party
to the appeal shall be permitted to introduce evidence in
court in addition to that contained in the departmental rec-
ord."
No part of this statute has as yet been discussed by the supreme
court. It is so explicit as to the matters with which it is concerned
as to leave little room for construction.3 8
The certified departmental file always contains various papers, in
addition to the transcript of testimony, such as medical reports and
reports of officials and employees of the Department. It was first de-
clared"9 that unsworn statements in the claim file, such as medical
reports, have no evidentiary value whatsoever and should be disre-
garded by both the Joint Board and the courts. Without mentioning
the Sweitzer case, subsequent decisions either announce or strongly
imply a contrary rule.40 These opinions obviously have raised serious
doubt as to the method of procedure in cases tried to a jury. If the
explicit decision upon the question in the Sweitzer case were followed,
it would seem that a more workable method of procedure would result.
The formal statements of position, such as applications and orders,
would serve to outline the issues, but only the sworn testimony would
be given evidentiary value by the trier of the facts. Such a method of
procedure would be consonant with the general practice in civil cases,
would accord the fundamental right to cross-examine witnesses and
would give full effect to the statutory requirement that the testimony
upon rehearing be under oath. While unquestionably it would be in-
consistent with the expressions of the court in the McKinnie, Nagel and
Devlin cases, it is significant that in none of these cases was the
Sweitzer case expressly overruled, or even mentioned.
C. Scope of Issues Before the Superior Court.
The rule that the courts have no original jurisdiction in industrial
insurance cases must be considered in determining the issues presented
by an appeal. It necessarily follows from that limitation on the courts'
jurisdiction that where the Department has made no decision on the
merits of a claim, the court has no power to pass upon the merits,4
and in other cases where the Department has rejected a claim without
39But see: Bradbury v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash. 162, 31
P. (2d) 87, and DeStoop v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 101 Wash. Dec.
294, as to the right of the claimant to introduce evidence in the superior
court, where rehearing has been denied.
'Sweitzer v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash. 28, 30 P. (2d) 980.
lMcKinnie v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 245, 37 P. (2d) 218;
Wintermute v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 183 Wash. 169, 48 P. (2d) 627;
Nagel v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash. 631, 66 P. (2d) 318; Devlin
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P. (2d) 952.
'Taylor v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 175 Wash. 1, 26 P. (2d) 391;
Baker v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 85, 42 P. (2d) 13; Puliz
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 184 Wash. 585, 52 P. (2d) 347; DeStoop
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 101 Wash. Dec. 294.
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considering the extent of disability, as where it has found a lack of
proof that the injury in question was sustained in the course of em-
ployment, the court's jurisdiction is limited to that single issue, and it
cannot fix the amount of compensation in the event of reversal.4"
On the other hand, where the Department has erroneously concluded
that no permanent disability was sustained, the superior court, if it
reverses that decision, should fix the extent of disability; and similarly,
where a claimant has petitioned to reopen his claim upon the ground
that his condition has become aggravated, the superior court, upon
reversing a decision of the Department that no aggravation occurred.
may fix the degree of disability.
43
Where the Department has made a final determination on an issue,
the court cannot simply send the case back to the Department for
further consideration of that issue.44 It must dispose of the issue
presented and confirm, reverse or modify the decision of the De-
partment.45
Despite the court's lack of original jurisdiction, where the Depart-
ment accepted as true the facts essential to the claim but rejected
the claim upon the sole ground that it was not filed within the time
allowed by law, the court, upon reversing the departmental decision,
properly ordered allowance of the claim upon the merits.4"
If not reviewed, a decision either of the Supervisor of Industrial In-
surance or of the Joint Board of the Department may become res
adjudicata, either against the claimant,4 T an employer, 48 or the De-
partment. 49 On the other hand, the Department sends out much in-
formal correspondence and what might be called interlocutory orders,
expressing unfavorable rulings, but not requiring review. Several cases
deal with such communications.3 0 In particular cases doubts must re-
main as to the right to or necessity for review, but in the Puliz case
there is a very helpful statement of the general rule:
"To constitute a final order from which a claimant must
appeal, it must clearly appear that the order is of such a na-
ture. A claimant must be advised that all of his claims, or
certain specified claims as the case may be, are thereby finally
determined."
Of course, a prior decision forecloses a later contention only if
necessarily inconsistent with it. As already mentioned, a decision fixing
the extent of permanent partial disability during the lifetime of a
workman does not preclude a contention on the part of his widow that
"DuFraine v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 180 Wash. 504, 40 P. (2d) 987.
"Noll v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 213, 36 P. (2d) 809.
"Boone v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 174 Wash. 123, 24 P. (2d) 454.
IsId.
'"Beels v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 301, 34 P. (2d) 917.
"Ek v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 91, 41 P. (2d) 1097.
"Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 84 P. (2d) 397.
"Abraham v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 160, 34 P. (2d)
457; Luton v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 183 Wash. 105, 48 P. (2d) 199.
"Goenen v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 182 Wash. 469, 47 P. (2d) 991;
Haugen v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 183 Wash. 398, 48 P. (2d) 565;
Smith v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 185 Wash. 443, 55 P. (2d) 603; Puliz
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 184 Wash. 585, 52 P. (2d) 347.
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he died while totally disabled as a result of his injury. And in the
Goenen case5 ' the court held that an unappealed decision of the Depart-
ment adverse to the claimant's contention that his condition had be-
come aggravated from a cataract on his right eye was not res adjudicata
as against a later contention that a detached retina which was not dis-
coverable until the removal of the cataract, resulted from the injury
in question and was a more important cause of his progressive blind-
ness than the cataract.
D. Summary Enforcement of Superior Court Judgment.
The superior courts may, by show cause proceedings, compel com-
pliance with judgments upon appeal, 52 but where the judgment in
question remanded the claim to the Department with instructions to
rate the disability of the claimant, and the Department made a rating
unsatisfactory to the claimant, he was relegated to an appeal from
the rating, the Department having complied with the judgment.53
The supreme court has not yet decided whether a claimant may
enforce a judgment of the superior court awarding compensation for
permanent partial disability, during the pendency of an appeal from
that judgment in which he seeks to be classified as permanently and
totally disabled.14
Compromise of Pension Claims
The statute55 permits the beneficiary and the Department, by mutual
agreement, to convert a pension, in whole or in part, into a lump sum
settlement equal or proportionate to the value of the pension as certi-
fied by the Insurance Commissioner, but in no event to exceed $4,000.
It is clear that, after tl~e right to a pension is established, no binding
settlement can be made for a sum which is less than $4,000 and also
less than the amount so certified.5 6 In the Booth case the right to a
pension was disputed and while that dispute was pending before the
Joint Board the claim was settled for $2,600, without certification
from the Insurance Commissioner. The actuarial value of the pension
exceeded $2,600, and the settlement was consummated by an order
recognizing the right to a pension and awarding the lump sum settle-
ment. The court held that the settlement was void and could be
attacked 'at any time.
It was generally assumed that the Booth case rendered void any
type of settlement in the consummation of which the Department de-
clared the status of the claimant under the Act and then paid him less
'Goenen v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 182 Wash. 469, 37 P. (2d) 991.
5-9eSt6op v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 197 Wash. 140, 84 P. (2d) 706.
'
3Powers v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash. 21, 30 P. (2d) 983.
"Dept. of Labor & Industries v. Stone, 190 Wash. 145, 67 P. (2d) 320,
nullified in 192 Wash. 699, 72 P. "(2d) 605.
cRzm. REv. STAT. § 7681.
rBooth v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash. 201, 64 P. (2d) 505;
Hagen v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 193 Wash. 555, 76 P. (2d) 592;',Horton
v. Dept of Labor & Industries, 199 Wash. 212, 90 P. (2d) 1009. Also, Hicks
v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 101 Wash. 586, involving the application
of Rmv. REv. STAT. § 7679 (j), which relates to settlements with nonresident
beneficiaries.
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than the amount prescribed for such status. However, in Godfrey v.
Department of Labor and Industries17 the court sustained a settlement
of a similar nature made during the pendency of an appeal to the
supreme court, upon two grounds:
1. That the payment was not, strictly speaking, accepted in
settlement of the pension reserve, but in settlement of a
pending suit; and
2. That a judgment dismissing the appeal to the supreme
court had been entered, based upon a stipulation of the parties
that the controversy had been settled.
The first reason does not seem a valid basis for distinction between the
Booth and Godfrey cases. In both cases the parties were, in the same
sense, settling a pending controversy. However, the court plainly in-
tended no modification of the Booth decision, and the result would
appear to be that a settlement of a pension claim for less than the
prescribed amount is valid only*if the right to the pension is disputed
and if that dispute is pending in the courts, where the settlement may
be consummated by a judgment.
5-198 Wash. 71, 86 P. (2d) 1110.
Size of Bar Journal Reduced
In December, 1939, the Board of Governors voted to reduce the
space allotment of the Bar Journal from 26 pages to 8 pages. The action
was necessary because of the lack of sufficient funds to maintain the
Journal in its former size.
